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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, judges have had tremendous flexibility in sentencing. Offering 
judges maximum discretion in the sentencing process allows them to consider 
not only an offender’s criminal history and the severity of the crime committed, 
but also the complex web of mitigating and aggravating factors present in each 
case and additional qualitative factors, such as a defendant’s testimony or self-
presentation in a courtroom. 
When judges are empowered with more discretion, however, there is 
heightened potential for inter-judge variability in sentencing. In order to reduce 
sentencing disparities caused by individual sentencers, several countries and 
jurisdictions, most notably in the United States, have enacted laws reducing 
judicial discretion over the type and length of sentence to be imposed on a 
defendant for a given offense. The purpose of these sentencing laws is to 
introduce more formal, rational decisionmaking processes and explicit rules 
into the legal sentencing system in order to improve inter-judge consistency and 
reduce disparities.1 Whether sentencing guidelines usually succeed in reducing 
unwarranted disparities is a highly debated question.2 
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 1.  See JOHN H. KRAMER & JEFFERY T. ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: LESSONS FROM 
PENNSYLVANIA 1–12 (2009); Robin L. Lubitz & Thomas W. Ross, Sentencing Guidelines: Reflections 
on the Future, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Office of Justice 
Programs, National Institute of Justice, Wash., D.C.), June 2001, at 1, 1–7; Joachim J. Savelsberg, Law 
That Does Not Fit Society: Sentencing Guidelines as a Neoclassical Reaction to the Dilemmas of 
Substantivized Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1346, 1346 (1992). 
 2.  See CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN 
06_GAZAL_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:51 PM 
132 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:131 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether unwarranted disparities are reduced, it 
is often argued that sentencing guidelines and other limits on judicial sentencing 
discretion have a substantial side effect on the balance of power in court. 
Instead of mitigating the effect of personal discretion, the guidelines transfer 
much of the sentencing power and discretion from judges to prosecutors.3 
Using a comprehensive set of data from Israel, we analyze sentencing 
outcomes for offenders convicted of aiding illegal aliens. These data are 
assessed to examine whether sentencing guidelines are likely to transfer 
sentencing power from judges to prosecutors in the Israeli system. 
The next section is devoted to the discussion of the Israeli sentencing 
process and a description of the evolution of the sentencing law for aiding an 
illegal alien, including the Israeli Supreme Court’s guiding decisions of Khatib 
and Abu-Salem.4 Next, the literature on the effects of sentencing reforms on 
judicial and prosecutorial sentencing discretion is discussed. After making 
comparisons with American sentencing guidelines studies on the effect on 
judicial and prosecutorial discretion, we turn to the examination of Israeli 
sentencing practices during three different consecutive sentencing periods for 
this offense: pre-Khatib, post-Khatib, and post-Abu-Salem. This examination 
includes an analysis of the extent to which prosecutors and the courts 
circumvented the judicial guidelines in Khatib and their modification in Abu-
Salem. Furthermore, we assess whether prosecutors gained additional 
sentencing control, previously vested in judges, after the Khatib guidelines 
limited judicial discretion in sentencing. The article concludes by exploring the 
legal and social ramifications of the findings. 
A.  Background on Sentencing Policy in Israel 
Israel is home to approximately eight million people. Despite its small 
population, Israel has a relatively high incarceration rate: not including security 
prisoners, the incarceration rate is 205 per 100,000 persons—twice the rate of 
most Western European countries5—though still much lower than the 
incarceration rate of the United States.6 
Israel’s criminal justice system is similar to that of most common law 
countries, but with some important distinctions. After the police make an 
arrest, prosecutors decide whether to press charges. If a defendant is charged, 
he or she can negotiate a plea agreement with the prosecutor, plead guilty 
 
PUNISHMENT 299–306 (2d ed., 2009) (“[D]etermining whether sentencing guidelines have reduced 
disparity is complicated.”) 
 3.  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 4.  CrimA 5198/01 Khatib v. State of Israel 56(1) PD 769 [2001]; CrimA 3674/04 Abu Salem v. 
State of Israel (Feb. 12, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription). 
 5.  Ruth Kannai, Sentencing in Israel, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 223, 223 (2010). 
 6.  See ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 
(8th ed., 2009), available at  http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. 
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without an agreement, or elect a bench trial. There are no juries in Israel.7 A 
public defense attorney is provided for unrepresented defendants in every case 
that might result in imprisonment. 
There are three levels of courts in Israel. The lowest level is the magistrate 
court, followed by the district court, which is both a court of first instance for 
serious crimes and an appellate court for other offenses, and then by the 
Supreme Court, the highest court in Israel. Because the offense selected for this 
paper is tried in magistrate courts, this lower court system is explored here in 
further detail. Magistrate judges try criminal cases that are punishable by a 
maximum of seven years imprisonment. A single magistrate judge presides over 
each case, except in special instances where a three-judge panel is appointed.8 
Israeli judges enjoy a high level of discretion in sentencing. Minimum 
sentences are rare, and even then, judges are permitted to consider mitigating 
circumstances and to depart from the minimum sentence as long as they state 
the reasons for their decision.9 Maximum penalties exist for all offenses, but in 
practice judges rarely impose sentences close to the maximum. Instead, they 
often offer significantly lighter penalties, including a fine, probation, or 
community service. Until 2011, judges under Israeli law had no directives 
outlining which factors to consider while sentencing, or how to prioritize them.10 
Given that sentences in Israel are subject to a relatively stringent appellate 
review, however, the appeals process is expected to mitigate some of the 
disparity resulting from judicial sentencing decisions. 
Until a decade or two ago, criminal law was rarely an issue in political 
activities and campaigns. This situation has changed lately, and a “tough on 
crime” political environment led the Knesset to increase the severity of 
sentencing, which resulted in the adoption of minimum sentences for several 
offenses.11 The Knesset has also discussed adopting a new sentencing reform, 
whereby a sentencing committee would determine starting-point sentences for 
common offenses. These starting-point sentences would instruct judges as to the 
 
 7. The Judiciary: The Court System, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2008), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Branches+of+Government/Judicial/The+Judiciary-+The+ 
Court+System.htm. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Murder is an exception to the rule. A mandatory life imprisonment for murder can be avoided 
only under a few exceptional circumstances prescribed by law. 
 10.  In 2011, after the data were collected, the Knesset adopted a new sentencing law making 
commensurability between the gravity of the offense and the sentence the main sentencing 
consideration. See Kannai, supra note 5; Penal Law (Amendment No. 113), 5737-1977, 2337 LSI 170 
(2012) (an unofficial translation of the amendment can be found at http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/ 
he/Events/Punishment/Documents/the%20new%20Israeli%20law.pdf). 
 11.  See Penal Law (Amendment No. 91), 5737-1977, 2067 LSI 2, § 377B (2006) (adopting a 
minimum sentence for offenses of keeping a person under conditions of slavery and human trafficking); 
Penal Law (Amendment No. 55), 5737-1977, 1746 LSI 226, § 329(B) (2000) (adopting a minimum 
sentence for causing grievous harm to a family member); Penal Law (Amendment No. 68), 5737-1977, 
1849 LSI 422, § 355 (2002) (adopting a minimum sentence for several sex offenses). 
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appropriate sentence for a typical case of a given offense.12 If the bill passes, 
judges will be expected to begin considering a sentence from the starting-point 
sentence, deciding on the degree and direction of deviation from it by weighing 
all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.13 Recently, the Knesset 
committee responsible for preparing the sentencing reform legislation decided 
to split it into two parts. They passed only the general part of the bill that deals 
with the sentencing considerations and factors, leaving the part that authorizes 
a committee to issue starting-point sentences to be decided in the future. Thus, 
the debate over sentencing guidelines in Israel is ongoing. 
Recently, many countries have considered or adopted sentencing guidelines. 
In the concurrent debate in the Knesset, which will shape future Israeli 
sentencing law, it is particularly critical and urgent to examine whether 
sentencing guidelines achieve their goal. Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in two cases about aiding an illegal alien, an offense according to 
section 12A of the Entry to Israel Law,14 offer a rare opportunity to empirically 
examine the effect of sentencing guidelines in Israel. 
B.  Sentencing for the Offense of Aiding an Illegal Alien 
Under section 12A of the Entry to Israel Law, it is an offense, punishable by 
a maximum term of two years of imprisonment, to harbor, employ, or 
accommodate a foreign national who is illegally in Israel.15 The majority of 
illegal aliens aided are Palestinians from the West Bank.16 
The Supreme Court established sentencing guidelines for aiding illegal 
aliens in the case of Khatib.17 Khatib was a contractor who drove an illegal alien 
whom he planned to employ from the West Bank into Israel.18 He was 
sentenced to thirty days of imprisonment and appealed the decision first to the 
district court and then, with permission, to the Supreme Court.19 The Supreme 
Court decided to hear his appeal in order to “clarify the appropriate sentencing 
policy for this offense.”20 The Court reviewed several decisions of lower courts, 
finding that sentences ranged from fines and deferred sentences, to prison terms 
 
 12.  See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Ruth Kannai, Determination of Starting Sentences in Israel—System 
and Application, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 232 (2010). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Entry into Israel Law, 5712–1952, 6 LSI 159, § 12A (1951–1952) (amended 1995). 
 15.  Id.  The conduct required for this offense will hereafter simply be described as aiding an illegal 
alien. Until 2000, this was an administrative offense, punishable mainly by a fine. Nevertheless, the 
prosecution had the power to indict such offenders instead of fining them, but had to state their reasons 
for doing so in writing. In fact, the police prosecution service disregarded the rule requiring the 
preference for an administrative fine, and used the regular criminal proceedings in virtually all cases. In 
April 2000, it became a regular criminal offense. 
 16.  Section 12A defines a foreigner as a person entering from the West Bank and Gaza. Since 
Gaza is relatively isolated, almost all of the illegal aliens come from the West Bank. 
 17.  See CrimA 5198/01 Khatib v. State of  Israel 56(1) PD 769 [2001]. 
 18.  Id. at 771. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
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of several months. Justice Tirkel, writing for the Court, stated that he supported 
the harsher approach, and commented that had the state appealed, he would 
have been in favor of substantially increasing the sentence due to the wave of 
terror killings at that time.21 According to Justice Tirkel, because the terror 
attacks are usually committed by Palestinians entering Israel illegally from the 
West Bank and Gaza, any help to such illegal aliens should be treated harshly.22 
The Supreme Court provided guidance to the lower courts, stating that, 
barring very exceptional circumstances, the appropriate sentence for aiding an 
illegal alien should be imprisonment that should not be deferred or exchanged 
for community service, even if the defendant committed the offense out of 
naïveté or due to pressing needs of some sort.23 The Court also clarified that 
lack of a prior criminal record should not qualify as an exceptional 
circumstance.24 Because Supreme Court decisions in Israel bind the lower 
courts,25 this ruling established a de facto mandatory sentencing guideline of a 
few months of imprisonment.26 
Like most minor crimes and misdemeanors, this offense is prosecuted by 
police prosecutors, not the district attorneys. Following the Khatib decision, the 
head of the prosecution division in the police headquarter in Jerusalem issued 
guidelines instructing prosecutors to request a term of imprisonment in every 
case of aiding an illegal alien.27 These prosecutorial guidelines caused many 
defendants to ask the attorney general to issue a stay of proceedings, arguing 
that the possible sentence they face is too severe, taking into account all the 
circumstances. These requests brought the issue to the attention of the 
Attorney General, who nominated a committee to examine the prosecutorial 
policy in these cases. In January 2005, the committee recommended that police 
prosecutors adopt a more lenient approach and take into account the personal 
circumstances of the defendant. However, the police objected to this change in 
policy.28 The attorney general rejected their objection, and in May 2005 the state 
attorney issued new guidelines to the police prosecutors. 
Soon after, in February 2006, a much more important change in policy was 
imposed. After the Supreme Court rejected several requests to review its policy 
over the years,29 the Court decided again to hear appeals from several separate 
 
 21.  Id. at 774. 
 22.  Id. at 773–774. 
 23.  Id. at 775. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744–1984, SH No. II 10 § 20(b), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm. 
 26.  The court did not specify the number of months. 
 27.  RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY OF EMPLOYING, DRIVING AND ACCOMMODATING ILLEGAL ALIENS IN ISRAEL (2005) (on 
file with authors). 
 28. Id. 
 29. CrimA 4094/05 Ka’adan v. State of Israel (Apr. 28, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription); CrimA 2392/05 Saliman v. State of Israel (May. 4, 2005), Nevo Legal Database  (by 
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defendants who had been sentenced to prison for aiding illegal aliens, and to 
issue guidance on the matter. This time, the Court adopted a more lenient 
approach. In Abu-Salem, the Court clarified that the wording of the 
“exceptional circumstances” provision from Khatib should not be interpreted 
too narrowly because sentences should always be individualized.30 
Implementing this new interpretation, the Court accepted the five separate 
appeals of defendants who had been sentenced to imprisonment under the 
Khatib precedent. Though the Khatib decision was not officially overturned in 
Abu-Salem, the acceptance of the appeals of all five defendants in Abu-Salem—
each with different circumstances—was perceived as altering the rigid Khatib 
guidelines. Thus, beginning with Abu-Salem, the Court set a weaker 
presumptive sentencing law for aiding an illegal alien in place. The new decision 
was quickly incorporated into the guidelines the State Attorney issued to police 
prosecutors.31 
Israeli case law therefore defined three different periods of sentencing for 
the offense of aiding an illegal alien. Before Khatib, no guidelines existed. 
Between Khatib and Abu-Salem, a relatively rigid sentencing guideline was in 
place. After Abu-Salem, a less rigid presumptive incarceration sentence was 
adopted. 
C.  Literature Review 
Critics of sentencing reforms in the United States often voice their concern 
that guidelines transfer sentencing power to the prosecutor: “the Guidelines 
provide opportunities for [prosecutors] to pursue their own agendas that did not 
exist pre-Guidelines.”32 Dale Parent, the Director of Minnesota’s Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission from 1978 through 1982, showed that changes in 
prosecutors’ charging and negotiation practices occurred following the 
implementation of the Minnesota guidelines.33 Professor Michael Tonry argued 
that mandatory penalty laws “provoke judicial and prosecutorial stratagems, 
 
subscription); CrimA 8758/04 Agrabia v. State of Israel (Sep. 27, 2004), Nevo Legal Database  (by 
subscription); CrimA 9145/03 Mosail v. State of Israel (Nov. 9, 2003), Takdin Legal Database (by 
subscription); CrimA 8474/03 Vazuz v. State of Israel (Sep. 21, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription). 
 30.  See CrimA 3674/04 Abu-Salem v. State of Israel (Feb. 12, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription). 
 31.  ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR EMPLOYERS, DRIVERS AND ACCOMMODATORS OF ILLEGAL 
ALIENS guidelines no. 2.15 (2006) (on file with authors). 
 32.  James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Inter-Judge Sentencing 
Disparity Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 302 (1999). 
 33.  DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 181–186 (1988). Parent wrote that immediately following the 
implementation of the Minnesota guidelines, the imprisonment rate for all convicted felons dropped, 
but, nevertheless, within five years, the imprisonment rate had returned to the pre-guidelines level. Id. 
Parent cites several reasons for the increase, including “changes in the distribution of offenders on the 
sentencing grid stemming from changes in prosecutors’ charging and negotiation practices.” Id. at 190. 
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usually by accepting guilty pleas to other nonmandatory penalty offenses or by 
diverting offenders from prosecution altogether, that avoid their application.”34 
Judges agreed that a shift in power occurred after the implementation of 
sentencing guidelines. A study commissioned by the American Bar Association 
found that 76% of federal judges and 59% of state judges thought sentencing 
guidelines offered prosecutors too much power in plea bargaining.35 Still, 73% 
of surveyed judges thought plea bargaining was used with about the right 
frequency.36 In one survey of twenty federal district judges, 80% of those 
surveyed said that the guidelines “have transferred discretion in large measure 
to the prosecution.”37 Additional discontent was expressed by probation 
officers, who complained that “‘fact bargaining’ is undermining the sentencing 
guidelines.”38 
Interestingly, some prosecutors felt that guidelines limited their discretion. 
A county prosecutor in Missouri stated, “Prosecutors continue to be unhappy 
with the one-size-fits-all recommendations in the Missouri Sentencing Advisory 
Commission’s recommendations. . . . There is, simply, no way to include enough 
variables in a recommended sentencing structure to provide a meaningful 
recommendation for any individual crime.”39 
These surveys may demonstrate that judges believe that the guidelines 
transferred sentencing powers. However, impressions based only on personal 
experience are often problematic sources of information about the reality.40 
Despite interest in the alleged transfer of power between the court actors, the 
many studies of the effects of sentencing guidelines failed to examine whether 
sentencing guidelines actually transferred control over sentences from judges to 
prosecutors.41 Such a study would require quantification of the sentencing 
powers of judges and prosecutors both before the implementation of sentencing 
guidelines and after—a task that is not trivial. 
 
 34.  Michael Tonry, Judges and Sentencing Policy—The American Experience, in SENTENCING, 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND TRAINING 137, 152 (Colin Munro & Martin Wasik eds., 1992). 
 35.  Don J. DeBenedictis, How Long is Too Long?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 74, 79. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 
2043, 2046 (1992). 
 38.  Fact bargains are plea agreements in which the parties stipulate the version of events that will 
be presented in court. See Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell & Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 262 
(1999). 
 39.  B. Watson, Prosecutors Seek Changes to Sentencing Guidelines, JEFFERSON CITY NEWS TRIB., 
June 8, 2010, at 7 (The prosecutors’ association added that the “recommended sentences . . . are 
unreasonably lenient, particularly for violent and sex crimes.”). 
 40.  Berndt Brehmer, In One Word: Not from Experience, 45 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 223 (1980). 
 41.  Rodney L. Engen, Have Sentencing Reforms Displaced Discretion over Sentencing from Judges 
to Prosecutors?, in THE  CHANGING  ROLE  OF  THE  AMERICAN  PROSECUTOR 75, 82 (John  L. Worral 
& M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) (analyzing studies in the field and concluding that none of 
them have directly addressed the question). 
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Several studies have examined part of this question, however. For example, 
moderate evidence of the circumvention of prosecutorial guidelines reported 
has shown that guidelines were manipulated in 20% to 35% of guilty plea cases 
for similarly situated offenders.42 In some cases, the extent of the deviation 
reached 70% to 90%.43 The same study shows that the circumvention of 
guidelines was much more common in weapons and drug possession cases, in 
which the guidelines prescribed sentences that were harsher than the typical 
pre-guidelines sentencing practices. The Khatib guidelines similarly deviated 
from the pre-Khatib practices. 
However, this study did not compare the effect of prosecutorial behavior 
under the guidelines to the effect that pre-guidelines prosecutorial practices—
such as charge bargaining and sentence recommendation—had on sentencing. 
The study showed that prosecutors can, and sometimes do, circumvent the 
guidelines, but it did not show whether prosecutors affect the sentences more 
after the establishment of the guidelines than they did before. This type of study 
fails to show that it is the guidelines that have led to the increase in 
prosecutorial sentencing power relative to the judicial power. 
An analysis of charge bargaining may reveal the effect of the guidelines on 
prosecutorial sentencing power. An increase in charge bargaining may be an 
indication of an increase in prosecutorial influence on sentencing, especially 
when the guideline sentence is prescribed for the “charged offense” and not the 
“real offense.”44 The studies examining prosecutorial practices do not show a 
clear pattern, however. One study shows a modest but significant decrease in 
charge bargains in Ohio after implementing guidelines.45 Since the Ohio 
guidelines are very “soft,” offering judges very limited guidance and 
considerable sentencing discretion, the authors concluded that “even modest 
shifts in sentencing practices might generate noticeable differences in 
processing at other decision points within the system.”46 
Conversely, various studies of the effect of the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guideline on charge reduction demonstrated that the overall guilty-plea rate 
remained constant under the guidelines, while charge bargains rose from 21% 
to 31% between 1978 and 1982.47 However, a more statistically sophisticated 
 
 42.  Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1284, 1285 (1997). 
 43.  Id. at 1292. 
 44.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines adopted a modified “real offense” sentencing system, 
requiring the judge to take into account the facts of the case, even if proving these facts in the jury trial 
phase would lead to a conviction of a more serious crime. In a “charge offense” sentencing system, this 
is prohibited. See generally Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified 
Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342 (1997). 
 45.  John Wooldredge & Timothy Griffin, Displaced Discretion Under Ohio Sentencing Guidelines, 
33 J. CRIM. JUST. 301, 314 (2005). 
 46.  Id. at 314. 
 47.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF THE MN SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION 71 (1984). 
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study analyzed the Minnesota data and concluded that the overall rates of 
charge bargaining stayed constant before and after the implementation of the 
guidelines.48 
Interestingly, even the Minnesota Sentencing Commission study that 
showed an increase in charge bargaining after the implementation of the 
guidelines did not indicate an increase in prosecutorial sentencing power. 
Although the reported rate of charge bargains increased after the 
implementation of the guidelines, the rate of sentence bargains was more than 
halved—falling from 60% to 26%.49 It is thus unclear whether prosecutorial 
control over sentencing increased or decreased following the introduction of the 
Minnesota guidelines. Perhaps in the pre-guidelines period, prosecutors 
influenced sentences through sentence bargaining, and then exerted the same 
level of influence after the implementation of the guidelines through the use of 
charge bargaining. The commission also admitted that many other unanalyzed 
factors might account for the differences and the descriptive statistics provided 
should not be used to make evaluative conclusions. To the extent that changes 
in the use of plea bargaining can signal an increase in the relative influence 
prosecutors and judges have over sentencing, these studies do not supply 
conclusive evidence of such a shift in power. 
Several other studies of other jurisdictions analyze the tendencies of 
prosecutors to reduce charges under different sentencing guidelines, but 
without comparing the result to the pre-guidelines charging policies.50 In a few 
studies, researchers have attempted to analyze whether prosecutorial or judicial 
discretion more strongly affected sentencing outcomes. Ronald Wright and 
Rodney Engen (2006) argued that prosecutorial discretion mattered more than 
judicial decisionmaking under a sentencing guidelines regime.51 The analysis of 
the changes in charges in North Carolina found that prosecutors reduced 
charges in nearly half of all felony cases that resulted in conviction, but that the 
effects did not apply equally to all crimes. The study also found that charge 
reductions heavily impacted the severity of the average sentence, such that 
 
 48.  See Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities under Determinate 
Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguideline and Postguideline Practices in Minnesota, 23 
CRIMINOLOGY 337, 348 (1985); see also Terence D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices 
Under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987) (showing that there was little change in the use of charge 
bargaining before and after the implementation of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines). 
 49.  See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 47. 
 50.  See Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish: Discretion and Sentencing Reform 
in the War on Drugs, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1357 (2000) (showing that prosecutors changed their charging 
behavior when sentencing guidelines changed in the state of Washington). For a review of several other 
studies showing that prosecutors often reduce charges, thereby affecting the sentences, see Engen, 
supra note 41 at 77–80. 
 51.  Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code 
on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935 (2006). 
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“charge reductions prior to sentencing have a much greater impact on sentence 
duration than does the choice among sentencing options under the grid.”52 
Conversely, a study of one unnamed Midwestern county found that judicial 
discretion over sentence length was substantially greater than prosecutorial 
discretion over charge bargaining.53 The researchers compared the number of 
charge reductions and sentence reductions, and the type of sentences meted out 
for a sample of closed felony cases bound over for trial in a city using voluntary 
sentencing guidelines in 1984.54 They found that when prosecutors reduced 
charges, the presumptive sentences for offenders sent to prison decreased 
significantly (an average of forty-six months per case)—but judges reduced the 
sentences even more (by more than one hundred months on average).55 For 
offenders sentenced to probation, prosecutors reduced sentences by an average 
of forty-one months, which judges brought down another fifty-nine months.56 
One explanation for the difference between these results could be that the data 
in the former study was collected from a jurisdiction using descriptive and 
voluntary sentencing guidelines, whereas the latter study used data from North 
Carolina, the state with the most mandatory sentencing guidelines.57 More to 
the point, these studies did not compare these post-guidelines results to pre-
guidelines measurements of sentencing discretion. 
The studies of sentencing regimes to date indicate that by using charge or 
fact bargaining, prosecutors gain some control over sentences when judges’ 
discretion is limited. However, only a few studies have compared the effect of 
prosecutorial sentencing power before and after the introduction of sentencing 
guidelines, and these studies have not confirmed the discretion transfer 
hypothesis. Additionally, most of these studies have used the rate of charge 
bargains (or charge reductions) as the main indicator for the amount of power 
prosecutors exert. However, the manipulation of charges in a post-guidelines 
environment can substitute for the manipulation of direct sentences in a pre-
guidelines environment (through sentence bargaining). In fact, the Minnesota 
sentencing commission’s study shows just that, indicating that the use of 
sentence bargaining at the time that charge bargaining became more common.58  
One cannot subsequently conclude from these studies that prosecutors’ 
sentencing power increased post-guidelines. 
Moreover, the literature to date does not show whether sentencing 
guidelines have a direct effect on sentences—an effect that is not intermediated 
 
 52.  Id. at 1972. 
 53.  J. Langley Miller & John J. Sloan, III, A Study of Criminal Justice Discretion, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 
107, 113 (1994). 
 54.  Id. at 112. 
 55.  Id. at 113. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., STATE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 5 (2008). 
 58. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 43. 
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through the charging powers. The existence of such a direct influence would be 
important for several reasons. First, charge bargaining is only a crude method 
for affecting the sentence, at least when sentencing guideline ranges are large 
enough. In many cases it is difficult to fine-tune sentences through charge 
bargaining. Second, charge bargaining is not always an option. For some 
offenses, there are limited options for reducing the charges. Third, many 
advocate the restriction of charge bargaining, among other things, in order to 
curtail prosecutors’ sentencing discretion. However, if sentencing guidelines 
transfer sentencing powers to the prosecutors even in the absence of charge 
bargaining, the efforts to limit charge bargaining might not be sufficient. 
Our study uniquely examines only one offense, an offense that is rarely the 
subject of charge bargaining. In this study, prosecutors charged the defendants 
only with aiding an illegal alien, so the charge bargaining was limited to 
dropping one or more counts of that offense in the few cases where the 
defendants were charged with several counts of this same offense. Accordingly, 
the current study examines the effect of sentencing guidelines on prosecutorial 
discretion when charge bargaining is very limited. 
This study also differs from its predecessors in several other aspects. First, 
previous studies concentrated on the United States. It is unclear whether the 
effect of sentencing guidelines on prosecutorial sentencing powers is unique to 
the American legal system and to what extent the phenomenon is likely to 
repeat in other common law jurisdictions that adopt sentencing guidelines. 
Second, most of the American studies examined the effects of a relatively 
detailed and rigid sentencing guidelines regime—most prominently the federal 
sentencing guidelines, which direct the judges to a very narrow sentencing 
range. Most of the states studied use a two dimensional grid,59 which is very 
different from the less technical guidelines that have been proposed or are in 
existence in other common law countries like England and Wales, and Israel. 
Prosecutors may have better control over sentencing under the first type of 
guidelines, but not under the second, less restrictive ones. Third, in an attempt 
to compare prosecutorial sentencing power before the guidelines and after, the 
previous studies analyzed many different offenses. In analyzing thousands of 
cases of one specific and simple offense that is usually committed by defendants 
with no prior criminal record, the risk that any finding will be the result of 
factors such as a change in the mix of the offenses brought by prosecutors or 
differences in the character of defendants through the years is substantially 
reduced. Hence, this study is the first to examine whether prosecutors gain 
direct sentencing powers when judges use non-grid sentencing guidelines. 
The study also analyzes the level of judicial compliance with the guidelines 
in Israel. Studies of the American Federal Sentencing Guidelines pre-Booker60 
 
 59.  In guidelines that use a grid, one axis represents the severity of the offense, and the other 
represents the defendant’s criminal record. The sentence or sentencing range is determined by the 
intersection of the severity of the offense (the row) with the defendant’s criminal record (the column). 
 60.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (striking down federal sentencing statute that 
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show that the circumvention of guidelines appears in an identifiable minority of 
cases.61 Many of these circumventions result from prosecutorial requests.62 
Concentrating on departures not sponsored or initiated by prosecutors reveals 
that the numbers are much lower. Between 2001 and 2007 only about 10% of 
the sentences included a downward departure from the guidelines that was not 
requested by the prosecution.63 In Washington, departures from the guidelines 
based on an exceptional-circumstances exception, which contain a similarly 
worded exceptional-circumstances rule as Khatib, appeared in fewer than 5% of 
the sentences.64 In Minnesota in 2009, where the guidelines offered only 
presumptive sentences, downward departures were found in about 20% of the 
sentences, and upward departures in another 4%.65 Yet, here too, in at least 
61% of these downward departures, the court stated that the prosecutor agreed 
or did not object to the departure from the guidelines. Only in 14% of cases did 
the judge mention the prosecutor’s objection when departing from the 
guidelines. In the remaining 25% of cases, it is unclear whether the prosecutors 
agreed with the departure or not.66 Hence, judges decided to depart from the 
guidelines contrary to prosecutors’ requests only in a small percentage of the 
cases—somewhere between 3% and 8% of the sentences. 
The Israeli Basic Law: Ihe Judiciary holds that “a rule laid down by the 
Supreme Court shall bind any court other than the Supreme Court.”67 Since the 
state can appeal to the district court when the magistrate’s court does not 
comply with the ruling, and can also request to appeal to the Supreme Court 
when it is necessary to assure conformity, one would expect that such a clear 
sentencing rule laid down by the Israeli Supreme Court would be followed in 
almost all cases, as it is in Minnesota, Washington, and the U.S. federal system. 
 
required district courts to impose sentences within the range established by the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, rendering the Guidelines advisory and nonbinding). 
 61.  See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 42, at 1285 (showing that approximately 20% to 35% of 
prosecutors circumvent the guidelines through charge bargaining, fact bargaining, bargaining over the 
guideline factors, and time bargaining); see also Brian D. Johnson, Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, 
The Social Context of Guidelines Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 
737 (2008). 
 62.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2012) (authorizing downward 
departure for defendants who have rendered “substantial assistance” to law enforcement; other 
departure sponsored by the prosecutors can result from plea agreements and fast track programs in 
immigration cases). 
 63.  Kate Stith, The Arc of Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 
YALE L.J. 1420, 1458–60 (2008). 
 64. See Kate Stith, Sentencing Guidelines in Washington State, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 
2013 at 105, 123–24. 
 65.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY 
STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2009, at 25 (copies may be requested from the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/sentencing_ 
practices.htm). Another 1% of the sentences included mixed departures. 
 66.  Id. at 30. In the remaining cases the prosecutor’s position was not stated in the decision. 
 67.  Israeli Basic Law: The Judiciary 5744–1984, SH No. II 10 § 20, available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm. 
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On the other hand, if the rule deviates substantially from previous practices, 
courts might still look for venues to circumvent this ruling, despite its clarity. 
D.  Hypotheses 
Because the Khatib decision instructed judges to impose a much harsher 
sentence than was common pre-Khatib, it was expected that when prosecutors 
asked the courts to depart from Khatib downward, courts would accept the 
request, knowing that this departure from the guidelines was unlikely to be 
appealed. On the other hand, when prosecutors insisted on incarceration, 
courts, knowing that an appeal would be likely to succeed, adhered to the 
Supreme Court’s instruction. Hence, we predicted that as the rigidity of the 
sentencing guidelines increased, prosecutors would gain more sentencing power 
at the expense of judicial discretion. We thus hypothesized that Khatib 
substantially increased the percentage of cases in which the courts followed the 
prosecutors’ sentence recommendations. In contrast, we hypothesized that 
Abu-Salem would reduce this percentage to a certain extent, though not to the 
pre-Khatib level. 
Given that the defendants needed the prosecutor’s mercy much more after 
Khatib, we hypothesized that plea bargains were more common post-Khatib, 
compared to pre-Khatib. Similarly, since Abu-Salem opened the door for more 
discretion in judicial sentencing, the rate of plea bargains was expected to 
decrease post Abu-Salem. 
II 
METHODOLOGY 
A.  The Offense 
The subject matter of this study is the way the legal system treats those who 
have been accused of aiding an illegal alien. We selected the offense of aiding 
an illegal alien for several reasons. First, it is a very common offense, and 
therefore the number of incidents is likely to be sufficient for an elaborate 
statistical analysis. Second, this offense is often committed by people with no 
prior criminal background, making it relatively easy to control for criminal 
record—one of the most significant variables affecting sentencing. Third, it is a 
very well-defined offense with hardly any variation that might differentiate 
between the offenses. Hence, the characteristics and severity of the offense can 
be easily controlled. 
B.  Data 
The study draws on two sources of data. First, it utilizes the police criminal-
records database, which contains data on the total population suspected of 
violating the relevant offense between 1995 and 2007.68 This database also 
 
 68.  For the offense of aiding an illegal alien, see Entry to Israel Law, 5712–1952, 6 LSI 159, § 12A 
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includes information about all of the court cases reported during this 
timeframe, during which the Supreme Court issued the two major sentencing 
decisions regarding this offense, Khatib v. The State of Israel and Abu-Salem v. 
The State of Israel.69 The police files include demographic and criminal 
information on the defendants—for example, age, nationality, gender, and 
criminal record—the date of the offense, whether charges were filed and in 
which court, and the court’s decision (including verdict and sentence). 
The second source of data is the court archives. The records from the police 
database of cases that ended up in court were identified in the court archives in 
order to examine the trial process more closely. The archive records were used 
to supplement the police data with information related to the court actors 
(ethnicity and gender of the judges, the prosecutors, and the defense attorneys). 
The court records also yielded more details about the offense: details indicating 
whether the defendant was driving, employing, or hosting the illegal alien; 
information revealing the motivation of the offender; and information relating 
to the legal process, such as the defendant’s plea, the plea agreement if one was 
reached, the type of plea agreement, and the sentencing recommendations of 
the prosecution and defense. 
After merging the data from both sources, we compiled a database of 3,277 
court cases in which aiding an illegal alien was the defendant’s only charge. 
These offenses were committed from 1995 through 2007, and were retrieved 
from fourteen magistrate courts, including all of the large magistrate courts in 
Israel. This process resulted in very detailed records about the offender, the 
offense, the judge, the prosecutor, the trial process, and the outcome. 
C.  Descriptive Graphic Analysis 
Prior to our multivariate analysis, we present a graphical depiction of the 
rate of incarceration decisions in each quarter of a year compared to the rate of 
prosecutorial prison recommendations during the same quarter. This form of 
presentation yields information about fluctuations in prosecutorial and judicial 
compliance with the guidelines put forth by the Supreme Court, as well as the 
effect prosecutorial requests had on the judicial decisions over the selected time 
span. We then separate the cases that resulted from a sentence bargain and the 
cases that resulted from an unconditional guilty plea or trials. This division 
helps us examine the association between prosecutorial requests and judicial 
decisions when the prosecution and the defendant did not reach an agreement. 
 
(1951–1952). 
 69.  CrimA 5198/01 Khatib v. State of Israel 54(1) PD 769 [2001]; CrimA 3674/04 Abu-Salem v. 
State of Israel (Feb. 12, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription). 
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D.  Dependent Variable 
The dependant variable for this study is the incarceration decision. If the 
offender was sentenced to any term of imprisonment, the variable was coded 1. 
If the sentence did not include imprisonment, it was coded 0.70 
E.  Independent Variables 
The independent variables included in the analysis are divided into three 
groups: socio-demographic variables, time-related variables, and prosecution-
related variables. 
Socio-demographic variables were used in an effort to control for variance 
related to personal characteristics. These variables have been traditionally 
considered to have an impact on the severity of the punishment: 
Offenders’ nationality was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 
representing Jewish and 0 representing Arab. 
Offenders’ age was coded as a continuous variable. 
Offenders’ family status was coded 1 if married and 0 if otherwise, which 
included single, divorced, and widowed. 
Offenders’ criminal history was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 
representing offenders with prior convictions and 0 representing offenders with 
no prior convictions. 
Judges’ nationality was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating 
that the judge was Jewish and 0 indicating that the judge was Arab. 
Due to a lack of overall diversity in the offenders’ gender (almost all 
offenders were male), gender was not entered as a control variable in this study. 
Time-related variables were used in an effort to measure the effect of the 
Supreme Court guidelines. This variable contains the three periods of 
sentencing: pre-Khatib, post-Khatib, or post-Abu-Salem. Another time related 
variable was the effect of terrorism, which according to the Supreme Court was 
the reason for their harsher penalty recommendation.71 This variable was 
measured by the accumulated number of terror-activities casualties in the three 
years preceding the sentence. 
Prosecution-related variables were used in an attempt to measure the 
prosecution’s impact on the trial’s outcome. The first variable here was 
prosecution request. It was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 meaning the 
prosecution asked for a prison sentence and 0 if the prosecution did not request 
imprisonment. The second variable was plea bargain, which is also a 
dichotomous variable in which 1 means the case was disposed through plea 
agreements and 0 means the disposition was not through a plea bargain. The 
type of plea bargain was also coded: when plea bargains included an agreed-
upon sentence recommendation (sentence bargains), they were coded in a 
 
 70.  Unlike the United States, Israel does not distinguish between jail and prison. 
 71.  See CrimA 5198/01 Khatib v. State of  Israel 56(1) PD 769, 773–774 [2001]. 
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separate variable. Plea bargains that referred only to the charges (charge 
bargains) were removed from our analysis (5.8% of the convictions, n=71). 
Appendix 1 provides a summary of the major variables included in this study, 
their coding, and the descriptive statistics for each period. 
F.  Data Analysis 
Most of the study’s variables are categorical. Since the dependent variable—
the courts’ decision to incarcerate—was treated as a dichotomous decision, 
logistic regression models were used to estimate the dichotomous outcome. 
Following the regression analysis, we calculated the predicted probabilities 
of incarceration for different profiles of offenders.72 All the independent 
variables that reached statistical significance in the regression models were 
included in the profiles according to the following scenarios: the best case 
scenario, in which the significant variables receive the values that minimize the 
probability of incarceration; the worst case scenario, in which the significant 
variables receive the values that maximize the probability of incarceration; and 
the average case scenario based on the calculated mean values of the 
independent variables.73 Next, in order to assess the impact of the prosecution’s 
request for a prison sentence, two more profiles were calculated: those with and 
without the prosecution’s request. These additional profiles were calculated 
while holding all other variables constant at their average.  The final set of 
profiles replicated the one described above for each of the periods we referred 
to in the study—pre-Khatib, post-Khatib, and post-Abu-Salem. 
The study focused on the court’s decision as to whether or not to incarcerate 
the defendant. This stage in the criminal justice process is dependent on earlier 
decisions, particularly whether the police and prosecution decide to press 
charges.74 Because we had the complete police database (N=34,343), which 
included cases that both did and did not result in indictment, we were able to 
calculate the likelihood of indictment for each period. The final sample 
included only those records where an indictment was issued (N=6,493). In the 
course of making this choice, the decision to incarcerate is not only a function of 
the independent variables at trial, but might also be affected by the probability 
of being charged following an arrest. Heckman’s correction (Lambda) was used 
to deal with potential sample selection caused by the decision not to press 
charges against many of the suspects.75 
 
 72.  Prob.(event)=1/(1+e-z) when Z=B0+ B1X1+ B2X2+ . . . BpXp. 
 73.  All independent variables that emerged as nonsignificant in the regression analysis were 
included in the calculation of the predicted probabilities at their mean value. 
 74.  Acquittals and post-indictment dismissals might also affect the result, but they were too few to 
make a difference. 
 75.  See James J. Heckman, The Incidental Parameters Problem and the Problem of Initial 
Conditions in Estimating a Discrete Time-Discrete Data Stochastic Process, in STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
OF DISCRETE DATA WITH ECONOMETRIC APPLICATIONS 179–95 (Charles F. Manski & Daniel 
McFadden eds., 1981) (Heckman recommended using a correction variable based on the first decision, 
which corrects the possible bias.). 
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III 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the rate of incarceration decisions pre- and post-Khatib, 
and post-Abu-Salem. As initially expected, we see a dramatic increase in 
incarcerations in the post-Khatib era. Prior to Khatib, the courts rarely imposed 
imprisonment, with only 3.3% of the convicted defendants being sentenced to 
prison. In contrast, following Khatib, 29.7% of the convictions resulted in 
incarceration. 
 After the Abu-Salem decision mitigated the Khatib guidelines, the 
incarceration rate went down to 16.4%. This result, on its face, indicates that 
the Supreme Court’s decision had an impact on sentencing. Surprisingly, 
however, a substantial majority of the cases following the Khatib ruling, but 
before Abu-Salem, still did not end in a decision to incarcerate. This result 
occurred despite the Supreme Court’s demand for a prison sentence for every 
such offender, save for exceptional circumstances. Although almost all convict-
ions in the database resulted from guilty pleas (95.0%), only about half of the 
guilty pleas followed a plea bargain. More specifically, of the guilty plea cases, 
in only about half of the cases (50.7%; n=1255) did the parties (the prosecution 
and the defendant) reach a sentence bargain. In 5.8% (n=71) of the cases, the 
parties reached only a charge bargain (these cases were excluded from our 
analysis). In 43.5% of the cases (n=1164), the guilty plea was the result of a 
unilateral decision of the defendant without an agreement with the prosecutors.  
 
Table 1: Imprisonment prior to and following the Khatib and Abu-Salem decisions. 
 
 No incarceration Incarceration Total 
Pre-Khatib 945 
(96.7%) 
32 
(3.3%) 
977 
(100%) 
Post-Khatib 948 
(70.3%) 
400 
(29.7%) 
1348 
(100%) 
Post-Abu-Salem 454 
(83.6%) 
89 
(16.4%) 
543 
(100%) 
Total 2347 
(81.8%) 
521 
(18.2%) 
2868 
(100%) 
 
Table 2: Plea bargains prior to and following the Khatib and Abu-Salem decisions. 
 
 Plea bargains Unilateral guilty pleas Total 
Pre-Khatib 274 
(30.7%) 
619 
(69.3%) 
893 
(100%) 
Post-Khatib 805 
(64.2%) 
449 
(35.8%) 
1254 
(100%) 
Post-Abu-Salem 423 
(81.5%) 
96 
(18.5%) 
519 
(100%) 
Total 1502 
(56.3%) 
1164 
(43.7%) 
2666 
(100%) 
06_GAZAL_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:51 PM 
148 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:131 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 41 45
%
Quarters of years
prosecution request court decision
Khatib decision Abu-Salem
decision
Because we included only cases where aiding illegal aliens was the only offense, 
charge bargains could include only removal of one or more charges out of 
several charges of this specific offense. We hypothesized that the motivation of 
the defendant to plead guilty unilaterally is higher when judges have more 
sentencing discretion—that is, when they are not bound by Supreme Court 
guidelines. As expected, the number of plea agreements went up sharply from 
only 30.7% in the pre-Khatib era to 64.2% post-Khatib. Yet, contrary to our 
expectations, the parties increasingly resorted to plea bargaining in the post-
Abu-Salem era, reaching plea bargains in 81.5% of all cases, when judges gained 
back at least some of their sentencing discretion. 
A.  Prosecution Requests and Court Responses 
Our main question was whether the Khatib guidelines transferred 
sentencing powers from judges to prosecutors. Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
convictions that resulted in imprisonment and the percentage of prosecutors’ 
requests for such a sentence in each quarter of each year between 1995 and 
2007. 
Figure 1 displays several clear results. First, more prison sentences were 
requested by the prosecution and more prison sentences were imposed by the 
courts post-Khatib than in the pre-Khatib era. But the increasing trend of 
requesting and imposing prison sentences seems to start more than a year prior 
to the Supreme Court decision, indicating that the Khatib guidelines, at least to 
some extent, followed an already existing trend rather than initiating it. Figure 1 
does demonstrate, however, that this trend gained a dramatic uplift following 
the Khatib ruling.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of prosecution requests for prison terms and court decisions for prison terms 
(calculated by quarters of years, with the Khatib decision handed down in the twenty-fourth 
quarter and Abu-Salem in the forty-first quarter). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
06_GAZAL_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:51 PM 
No. 1 2013] PROSECUTORIAL POWER 149 
Similarly, the decline in prosecutors’ request for prison sentences and the 
decline in incarceration decisions also began about a year and a half before the 
Abu-Salem decision. It appears that here too, the Supreme Court followed an 
already existing trend of declining incarcerations. This decline in prosecutors’ 
requests for prison sentences started long before the state attorney issued the 
new guidelines that gave a green light to a softer prosecutorial approach.76 
 As Figure 1 shows, line prosecutors and magistrate judges changed the 
policies long before either the state attorney’s guidelines or the Supreme 
Court’s guidelines allowed such a change. Yet, Khatib probably had an effect on 
prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations. A year after Khatib, prosecutors 
started asking for imprisonment in the majority of cases, and by the end of 2004, 
two years after Khatib, requests for prison terms reached a peak of 73% of the 
cases in the thirty-fifth quarter. Judges, on the other hand, imposed prison 
sentences only in a minority of cases in all quarters but one: quarter thirty-six, 
in which 51% of the convictions resulted in imprisonment. 
 Figure 2 adds another dimension to the discussion: the effect of sentence 
bargains. The gray lines represent the percentage of plea agreements in which 
the prosecutors asked for imprisonment (dashed gray line) and the percentage 
in which judges followed the request and handed down a prison sentence 
(continuous gray line). In this same figure, in black, we added the same 
information about the cases where the defendants were convicted without a 
plea bargain (mostly following a unilateral guilty plea). The percentages of 
cases where the prosecutors asked for imprisonment (dashed black line) and the 
percentage of actual prison sentences imposed (continuous black line) 
throughout the time period are also presented. 
 
Figure 2: Percent of prosecution requests for prison and court decisions of prison in cases with 
and without plea bargaining (calculated by quarters). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76.  ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR EMPLOYERS, DRIVERS AND ACCOMMODATORS OF ILLEGAL 
ALIENS, STATE ATTORNEY’S GUIDELINES guidelines no. 2.15  (2005) (on file with authors). 
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As expected, when the parties reached a plea bargain, most of the 
prosecution’s sentence recommendations for imprisonment were accepted. In 
some cases the parties to the sentence bargain agreed that the prosecutor would 
ask for imprisonment while the defendant would be allowed to ask for a 
different sentence. This granted the courts some discretion, as not all of the 
prosecutors’ sentence recommendations were accepted. 
 Less expected was the relatively high rate of incarceration sentences in plea 
bargained cases following the decision in Khatib. While we expected that 
sentence bargaining would mainly be used to circumvent the harsh Khatib 
guidelines, in the minority of cases in which the defendant opted for a plea 
bargain, the process very often ended with the imposition of a prison sentence. 
The results of the other cases that were not disposed through plea 
bargaining are even more unexpected. In most non-bargained cases in the post-
Khatib era, prosecutors requested prison sentences. However, judges showed a 
high level of independence and, contrary to our hypothesis, often rejected the 
prosecutors’ requests. Between Khatib and Abu-Salem only 43% of the 
prosecutors’ requests for imprisonment were accepted absent plea bargaining. 
In all other cases absent plea bargaining, the court departed from the Khatib 
rule contrary to the prosecutor’s request. In other words, in the post-Khatib era, 
defendants who did not plea bargain had a much better chance of escaping a 
prison sentence than those who plea bargained, regardless of the prosecutor’s 
request. 
This result contradicts two of our hypotheses. First, it shows that the 
circumvention of the Khatib guidelines did not occur by an increased resort to 
plea bargaining. Second, it shows that judges were much more willing than 
expected to disregard the Supreme Court ruling, even without the prosecutors’ 
agreement. The result might even imply that some of the defendants who were 
willing to accept a prison sentence through a plea bargain would have been 
better off pleading guilty without bargaining, and putting their faith in the 
hands of the judge instead of the prosecutor. 
B.  Multivariate Analysis 
The next step in the analysis was to determine which variables affected the 
probability of receiving a prison sentence following a conviction. Heckman’s 
correction for the probability of being indicted was added to the regression 
model. Table 3 presents a stepwise logistic regression that contains four sets of 
variables (geographic variables, socio-demographic variables, time-related 
variables, and prosecution-related variables) that were entered sequentially. 
Presenting the five steps separately enables us to follow the changes in the 
effect of the variables as more independent variables are introduced into the 
model. This method of presentation underscores in this particular case the 
dramatic effect that the introduction of the prosecution-related variables 
(especially the prosecution’s sentence recommendation) had on the relevance 
of the other sets of independent variables. 
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The first variable entered into the regression was the district in which the 
cases were tried (all were compared to the district of Haifa, which was the 
omitted category). In step 1 the regression reveals that there is a variation 
between court districts. Two districts are less punitive than Haifa (the Tel Aviv 
district and the Northern district) and one district is significantly more punitive 
(Jerusalem). As the other sets of variables were entered into the regression, the 
effect of the district declined and only the Tel Aviv district (which showed a less 
punitive attitude) maintained its significance and seemed to affect the 
likelihood of imprisonment. 
As far as the demographic variables are concerned (step 2), nationality 
seems to play a significant role in all steps. Arabs seem to have a higher 
probability of receiving a prison sentence than Jews. Furthermore, Jewish 
judges tend to be more likely to impose prison sentences than Arab judges. In 
all steps, the prior criminal record of the defendant also seems to be a 
significant variable in the decision to impose a prison sentence. 
In step 3, we first added the variable representing the period. Following the 
distribution of cases in Figures 1 and 2, we divided the time frame into five 
consecutive periods: 
1. Pre-Khatib 1—Quarters 1–19—from 1995 until the outbreak of the Second Intifada 
(the wave of uprising and terror attacks against Israeli targets that started in 
October 2000), when the rate of prosecution requests for prison sentences started 
rising noticeably;
77
 
2. Pre-Khatib 2—Quarters 20–23—from the start of the Intifada until the Khatib 
decision; 
3. Post-Khatib 1—Quarters 24–36—from the Khatib decision until the end of 2004, 
when the prison sentence rate peaked (which coincided with a decline in the 
Intifada); 
4. Post-Khatib 2—Quarters 37–40—from the beginning of 2005 until the Abu-Salem 
decision; and 
5. Post-Abu-Salem—Quarters 41–45—from Abu-Salem until the end of 2007. 
As Table 3 shows, in periods 3, 4, and 5 the probability of imprisonment 
increased compared to period 1. 
 In the next step (step 4), we introduced the number of terror casualties in 
the three years preceding the sentence. This variable arguably represents the 
effect that terror had on the prevalence of prison sentences. The regression 
shows that the larger the number of terror casualties, the greater the probability 
of courts imposing prison sentences. Introducing this variable reduced the effect 
of periods 4 and 5 on imposing prison sentences. However, the effect of period 
3, the one immediately following the Khatib ruling, remained significant, even 
when controlling for terror casualties. 
 
  
 
 77.  The attempt to stop residents of the West Bank and Gaza from entering Israel is motivated 
mainly by security reasons, and the level of terrorism was thus included as a factor. 
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Table 3: Logistic regression for court imprisonment decisions. 
 
 B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
B 
(S.E) 
Exp(B) 
B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
Lambda -.023
(.103)
.997
-.158
(.111)
.854
-.080
(.118)
.923
-.061 
(.119) 
.941 
.013
(.151)
1.013
Court regions1  
Northern District -1.166***
(.299)
.312
-.422
(.333)
.656
-.533
(.353)
.587
-.646 
(.358) 
.524 
-.039
(.419)
.962
Tel Aviv District -1.053***
(.249)
.349
-.705*
(.261)
.494
-.847**
(.283)
.429
-.946*** 
(.286) 
.388 
-.984***
(.309)
.374
Jerusalem District .832***
(.209)
2.298
.805***
(.218)
2.238
.236
(.246)
1.266
-.031 
(.254) 
.970 
.190
(.306)
1.209
Southern District -.108
(.412)
.898
.236
(.434)
1.266
.362
(.477)
1.436
.295 
(.477) 
1.344 
1.253*
(.576)
3.502
Central District .141
(.195)
1.152
.384
(.205)
1.468
.091
(.229)
1.095
-.036 
(.234) 
.964 
.405
(.265)
1.499
Demographic characteristics  
Nationality -1.163***
(.136)
.313
-.980***
(.143)
.375
-.912*** 
(.145) 
.402 
-.742***
(.180)
.476
Age -.008
(.005)
.992
-.011*
(.005)
.989
-.012* 
(.005) 
.988 
-.012
(.007)
.988
Family status -.419**
(.144)
.658
-.328*
(.153)
.721
-.324* 
(.155) 
.723 
-.166
(.197)
.847
Prior conviction .637***
(.137)
1.890
.790***
(.148)
2.203
.824*** 
(.150) 
2.280 
.484*
(.182)
1.623
Judges’ nationality 1.906***
(.413)
6.728
2.011***
(.412)
7.469
2.030*** 
(.421) 
7.613 
2.231***
(.468)
9.313
Periods2  
Period 2 (Pre-Khatib 2) .230
(.432)
1.259
.479 
(.435) 
1.615 
.250
(.485)
1.285
Period 3 (Post-Khatib 1) 2.253***
(.235)
9.513
1.214*** 
(.304) 
3.367 
1.015**
(.359)
2.760
Period 4 (Post-Khatib 2) 1.626*** 1.199*** 1.067***
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(.197)
5.082
(.212) 
3.317 
(.262)
2.907
Period 5 (Post-Abu-Salem) .074***
(.179)
1.077
.185*** 
(.185) 
1.404 
.188
(.247)
1.207
Terror atmosphere  
Casualties .004*** 
(.001) 
1.004 
.001
(.001)
1.001
Prosecution requests  
Plea bargaining  -.642
(.563)
.526
Prosecution- prison  3.273***
(.474)
26.392
Interaction– plea*prosec_prison   1.811***
(.581)
6.115
Constant -1.306 -.2.290 -3.688 -3.221 -5.867
-2 Log likelihood 2276.918 2115.505 1895.352 1861.944 1197.532
Chi square 147.655*** 161.413*** 220.153*** 33.407*** 664.412***
Nagelkerke R Square .095 .191 .313 .331 .632
 
1 Each category of the predictor variable (except the reference category) is compared to the 
reference category which is the first category. 
2 Each category of the predictor variable (except the reference category) is compared to the 
average effect of the former categories. 
* p < .05; **p < .005; ***p < .001. 
 
Finally, in step 5, we added the prosecution-related variables. As expected, 
Table 3 shows that the most significant predictor of the courts’ decision to 
incarcerate is the prosecution’s request. This tendency is enhanced when the 
plea includes also a punishment recommendation, as shown by the interaction 
variable presented in Table 3. 
 Next, we focused on the extent to which the prosecution’s request for a 
prison sentence affects the likelihood of such a sentence, while controlling for 
the variable of a plea bargain. In other words, we wanted to determine whether 
the request of the prosecution in and of itself affected the court’s decision or 
whether it was the plea bargain that mattered. According to Table 4, as 
expected, the prosecution’s request for imprisonment was found to have the 
strongest effect on imposing a prison sentence. In order to highlight the effect 
of the prosecution’s request on the likelihood of incarceration, we calculated 
the ratio between the odds ratios of the prosecution effects.78 The results show 
 
 78. The formula {[odds/(odds+1)] - .50} converts odds ratios to probabilities and enables to 
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that the prosecution’s requests increase the probability of incarceration in plea 
bargained cases by 49.85% and in 46.6% in the absence of plea bargain. 
Table 4 highlights the effect of the requested punishment among the plea-
bargained cases. The prosecution’s request becomes clearly the most dominant 
variable in the regression. The unusually high odd ratio of 682 indicates that 
when the prosecutor requested imprisonment as part of the plea, almost 
invariably, the judge impose imprisonment. When the punishment, whatever it 
might be, is part of the agreed bargain, both the norm and the common practice 
is that the judge will accept it. Once a plea bargain that includes an agreed 
punishment is presented, all other independent variables become insignificant 
or have negligible effect on the outcome,. 
In the absence of a plea agreement, terrorism did not have a significant 
effect, but the period of sentencing was statistically significant. The periods that 
seem to be related to a high probability of the imposition of prison sentences 
were those that followed the Khatib decision (periods 3, 4, and 5). Demographic 
variables also produced significant effects. The regression shows that absent a 
plea bargain, the likelihood of imprisonment increased when the defendants 
were Arabs, when the judges were Jewish, and when the defendant had a prior 
criminal record. 
 
Table 4: Logistic regression for court decisions for imprisonment—divided by five periods—
differential models. 
 Cases with a plea bargain
(n=1276) 
Cases without a plea bargain 
(n=1475) 
 B 
(S.E) 
EXP(b) B 
(S.E) 
EXP(b) 
Lambda .067 
(.342) 
1.069 -.080 
(.198) 
.923 
Court regions1     
Northern region -.560 
(1.102) 
.571 .257 
(.488) 
1.294 
Tel Aviv region .070 
(.950) 
1.073 -.947** 
(.341) 
.388 
Jerusalem region 1.046 
(.810) 
2.847 -.085 
(.410) 
.919 
Southern region 2.354 
(1.616) 
10.529 .947 
(.647) 
2.579 
Central region 1.748* 
(785) 
5.741 .312 
(.296) 
1.367 
Demographic characteristics     
Nationality -.736 
(.419) 
.479 -.640* 
(.232) 
.527 
 
measure and compare the effect prosecution requests has on incarceration decisions. See Cassia Spohn 
& David Holleran, The Imprisonment Penalty Paid by Young, Unemployed Black and Hispanic Male 
Offenders, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 281, 293 (2000). 
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Age -.002 
(.017) 
.998 -.004 
(.009) 
.996 
Family status -.525 
(.447) 
.592 -.283 
(.251) 
.754 
Prior conviction -.068 
(.432) 
.934 .749*** 
(.226) 
2.115 
Judges’ nationality .815 
(1.222) 
2.260 2.415*** 
(.551) 
11.192 
 
Terror atmosphere 
    
Casualties  .006** 
(.002) 
1.006 -.001 
(.001) 
.999 
Periods2     
Period 2 (Pre-Khatib 2) -16.334 
(4309.29) 
689.0843 .324 
(.502) 
1.382 
Period 3 (Post-Khatib 1) 6.535 
(2154.64) 
49.784 1.583*** 
(.502) 
4.868 
Period 4 (Post-Khatib 2) 3.908 
(1436.43) 
20.463 1.486*** 
(.331) 
4.419 
Period 5 (Post-Abu-Salem) 3.019 
(1077.32) 
1.006 .163 
(.400) 
4.868 
Prosecution requests     
Prosecution-prison 6.526*** 
(.538) 
682.4764 3.353*** 
(.482) 
28.581 
Guilty plea -  -.105 
(.324) 
.901 
Constant -6.175 -6.996 
-2 Log likelihood 267.916 689.245 
Chi square 846.987*** 348.940*** 
Nagelkerke R Square .848 .442 
 
1 Each category of the predictor variable (except the reference category) is compared to the 
reference category which is the first category. 
2 Each category of the predictor variable (except the reference category) is compared to the 
average effect of the former categories. 
3 The second period of the study is very short, including only a small amount of cases , none of 
which ended in plea bargain and prison sentence. The odds ratio is calculated to compare the 
odds of prison sentence across groups and since one of the groups has 0 cases the calculated odds 
ratio is extremely high. 
4 The impact of prosecution prison recommendation on receiving prison sentence is measured by 
the odds of prison recommendation to receive prison sentence divided by the odds of non-prison 
recommendation to receive prison sentence. Since courts rarely impose harsher sentences than 
requested in the plea bargain, the last group is very small (only 6 cases, which comprise 2.5% of 
the prison sentences) and the odds ratio is extremely high. 
* p < .05; ** p < .005; *** p < .001. 
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Following the regression analysis (Table 4), we calculated the predicted 
probabilities (Table 5) for profiles representing the best, worst, and average 
case scenarios. The results show an identical pattern for the best, worst, and 
average scenario profiles, indicating that in the absence of plea bargain, the 
probability of incarceration is higher than in the plea bargained cases.  
However, when examining the effect of the prosecution’s request on the 
incarceration probabilities—when all other variables are held at the average—
the pattern reverses. The probability of receiving a prison sentence declines 
without a plea bargain: a 16% chance in cases without a plea bargain as 
opposed to a 57.9% chance in cases with a plea bargain. This pattern seems to 
contradict our expectation that a plea bargain ought to reduce the chances of 
receiving a prison sentence. It also shows that the impact of the prosecution in 
cases where there was no plea bargaining was significantly weaker. 
 
Table 5: Probabilities of being incarcerated. 
 
 With a plea bargain Without a plea 
bargain 
Best-case scenario .005 .0003 
Average-case scenario .028 .105 
Worst-case scenario .976 .966 
Prosecution asked for prison sentence .772 .338 
Prosecution did not asked for prison sentence .004 .017 
 
IV 
DISCUSSION 
At the onset of our study, we hypothesized that the strict sentencing 
guidelines would move sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. 
Despite the common belief that this displacement of power does occur, studies 
thus far have had difficulty proving it. The Israeli Supreme Court ruling in the 
Khatib case presented a unique opportunity to examine the effect of such 
guidelines, particularly because of the focus on only one single offense. 
However, the results do not support the displacement of discretion hypothesis. 
Our findings show that the trend of “getting tough” did not start with the 
Khatib ruling, and the trend of easing off did not start with Abu-Salem. It is true 
that plea bargains became more common following Khatib, but the use of plea 
bargaining kept increasing after the Abu-Salem decision as well, when the 
guidelines became less stringent. Thus, the popular use of plea bargains is not 
necessarily the result of the decision in Khatib. At the very least, additional 
reasons may explain the continuous resort to plea bargains. These may include 
increased caseloads in the entire criminal justice system, as well as pressures for 
efficiency and the quick disposition of cases. 
More importantly, when examining cases where the parties did not come to 
an agreement, we found no indication of an increase in prosecutorial sentencing 
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power. It is true that, following Khatib, the overall number of prison sentences 
did increase, even in the absence of plea bargains. However, there is no 
evidence that would allow us to attribute this trend to increased prosecutorial 
power. Following Khatib, prosecutors asked to imprison most of the defendants 
who did not reach a plea agreement, but the courts rejected most of these 
requests despite the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
Prosecutors may have gained power in plea bargaining. Following Khatib, 
many defendants agreed to a sentence bargain that included an imprisonment 
component. It might be that defendants, knowing of the Khatib decision and 
believing that judges would follow it, found no reason to believe that they had a 
chance of escaping prison if they placed their faith in the hands of the court. 
Therefore, they were willing to strike a bargain that might send them to prison, 
but perhaps for a shorter term. 
However, these defendants might have been wrong. When a plea bargain 
was not reached, the prosecution had a difficult time convincing the courts to 
impose a prison sentence, despite the Khatib guidelines. Prosecutors may have 
gained sentencing power because defendants simply were not aware of how 
often the courts failed to comply with the guidelines, but in the absence of plea 
bargains it was the court, not the prosecutors, who departed from the 
guidelines. 
Our study does not support the displacement of power hypothesis. Courts 
have continued to exert sentencing power by refusing to impose incarceration 
sentences even when prosecutors have asked for such sentences based on the 
existing Supreme Court Guidelines. The actual effect of the courts’ independent 
approach might be even stronger than the data suggests. Prosecutors are repeat 
players in court. They appear before the same judges time and time again. 
Hence, when there is no plea bargain, they may often adjust their 
recommendation in light of the policy of the court, refraining from asking for 
imprisonment when they know they will not receive such a sentence. If this is 
the case, the magnitude of the magistrate courts power is even stronger than our 
result indicates. Though this speculation needs further testing, it is very likely 
that had the judges adhered to the Khatib ruling more closely, prosecutors 
would have asked for imprisonment in many more cases. 
Why have judges demonstrated more independence than the prosecutors? 
After all, when judges reject the prosecutors’ request to abide by the guidelines, 
they face the risk of being reversed on appeal. On the other hand, prosecutors 
who decide to be more lenient than the guidelines require cannot be reversed—
and judges rarely impose a harsher sentence than asked. Accordingly, one 
would expect the prosecutors to depart from the guidelines more often than the 
judges. Why did the opposite occur? 
Several explanations for this puzzling result are possible. Perhaps judges are 
less concerned with appeals than expected. It is possible that police prosecutors, 
who frequently appear before the same judge, do not initiate such appeals very 
often. Similarly, the district attorneys, who must authorize each appeal, do not 
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necessarily prioritize appeals on such sentences. Moreover, district courts do 
not necessarily differ from the magistrate in their willingness to circumvent the 
guidelines. While a second, discretionary appeal from the district court to the 
Supreme Court could discipline district courts, the state attorney is very 
selective in initiating such second appeals. In fact, in a search of Supreme Court 
decisions in requests for discretionary appeal, we could not find even one 
request of the state to consider an appeal against a district court decision that 
circumvented Khatib. Only defendants appealed to the Supreme Court in this 
type of case. Hence, pro-defendant departures from the guidelines are rarely 
appealed and even less often reversed. Additionally, it might be that judges are 
not so concerned about being reversed. After all, these are not very salient 
cases and reversals would not likely impugn their reputations. 
On the other hand, we might have underestimated the effect of the internal 
prosecutorial guidelines. Perhaps prosecutors did not use their power to 
circumvent the guideline more often because of the internal guidelines 
instructing them to ask for imprisonment sentences in these cases. The high 
levels of compliance with the guidelines may be attributable to the fact that the 
prosecutors here are police prosecutors who serve in an organization that 
emphasizes hierarchy. Unlike judges, who are subject only to the vague notion 
of “the law,” police prosecutors are accountable to their superiors, and their 
performance is routinely examined. Police prosecutors might have been 
concerned if imprisonment rates for this offense in their office were too low, 
despite the clear attempt of the office in Jerusalem to strictly enforce the law on 
that offense. In other words, prosecutorial guidelines might have mitigated the 
effect that judicial sentencing guidelines had on prosecutorial sentencing 
discretion. 
It is unclear to what extent we can generalize the effect of the Khatib 
sentencing guideline. It is possible that judges will adhere to guidelines more 
closely when most cases are subject to a guidelines regime. Moreover, the 
Khatib guidelines clearly deviated from the pre-Khatib practices. Courts might 
be more willing to follow guidelines that better represent the preguidelines 
practices. 
Yet the findings do question whether sentencing guidelines in Israel can 
achieve their goals. It seems that not only prosecutors are able to circumvent 
such guidelines, but that courts can also do the same. Moreover, the proposed 
guidelines system, which relies on starting-point sentences, is much weaker than 
the Khatib guidelines, which required a specific type of sentence absent 
exceptional circumstances. If courts often circumvented this rigid guideline, 
issued by the highest judicial instance in the country, they are even more likely 
to disregard the proposed weaker guidelines when they perceive it as unjust or 
wrong. 
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V 
APPENDIX:  
MAJOR VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY, THEIR CODING,  
AND THE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH PERIOD 
 
Variables Codings Pre-Khatib Post-Khatib Post Abu-Salem 
Defendants’ 
Nationality 
1 = Jewish 
0 = Non-Jewish 
573 (54.3%) 
483 (45.7%) 
593 (38.6%) 
945 (61.4%) 
250 (41.2%) 
357 (58.8%) 
Defendants’ Age Years 39.37 (11.750) 39.92 (12.602) 39.32 (12.719) 
Defendants’ 
Family Status 
1 = Married 
0 = Not Married 
945 (87.0%) 
141 (13.0%) 
1307 (83.0%) 
267 (17.0%) 
473 (76.7%) 
144 (23.3%) 
Defendants’ 
Prior Convictions 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
235 (23.8%) 
753 (76.2%) 
240 (17.4%) 
1142 (82.6%) 
84 (13.6%) 
473 (84.9%) 
Guilty Pleas 1 = Plea Bargain 
0 = Unilateral      
Guilty Plea 
274 (30.7%) 
619 (69.3%) 
805 (64.2%) 
449 (35.8%) 
423 (81.5%) 
97 (18.5%) 
Prosecution 
Request for 
Imprisonment 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
761 (80.6%) 
183 (19.4%) 
931 (77.8%) 
265 (22.2%) 
342 (73.9%) 
121 (26.1%) 
Incarceration 1 = Yes 
0 = No 
32 (3.3%) 
945 (96.7%) 
400 (29.7%) 
948 (70.3%) 
89 (16.4%) 
454 (83.6%) 
 
